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Scope Limitationsfor Searches Incident to Arest
The fourth amendment protects the privacy and security of indi-
viduals' by prohibiting unreasonable governmental intrusions.2 The
Supreme Court has significantly expanded the ambit of the fourth
amendment's protections in recent cases;3 but the wall of constitutional
defenses against unreasonable invasions will not be complete until the
Court has formulated rules to limit appropriately the scope of warrant-
less criminal searches, and particularly of searches incident to arrest.4
The principles and policies recently applied by the Court to limit
housing inspections, 5 electronic eavesdropping,6 and on-the-street frisks-
would, if extended to searches incident to arrest, produce needed rules
for the control of such searches.
I. Current Law of Searches Incident to Arrest: Theory and Practice
The present rule governing searches incident to arrest grows out of
United States v. Rabinowitz,8 decided by the Supreme Court nearly
1. The Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1960), refers to the fourth amend-
ment as creating a "right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully
and particularly reserved to the people ... " Earlier, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886), the Court held that the fourth and fifth amendments apply to "all inva-
sions on the part of the government and its employ's of the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life." Several of the amendments to the Constitution protect different
aspects of privacy, but no single amendment protects privacy per se. See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
2. The right of the government to make some intrusions can, howeer, be inferred
from both the reference in the fourth amendment to a warrant procedure and the
emphasis on reasonableness:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects.
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
3. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Katz s.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court. 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See
v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
4. The granting of certiorari this term in Chimne v. California, in which petitioner
challenges a wide-ranging warrantless search of his home, provides the Court with an
opportunity to reevaluate the proper limits of searches incident to arrest. People v.
Chimel, 61 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Ct. App. 1967), aff'd sub norn. Chiinel v. California, 68 Cal. 2d
448, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421, cert. granted, 89 S. Ct. 404 (1968).
5. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967) (business premises). See Note, The Forth Amendment and Housing Inspectilons,
77 YALE L.J. 521 (1968).
6. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See The Suprene Court. 19o7 Tertn. W!
HARv. L. REv. 63, 187-96 (1968).
7. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 USi. 40 (1968). See
LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and lle'.ond
. 
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Mic. L. REv. 39 (1968).
8. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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twenty years ago. In Rabinowitz, federal officers, acting under the
authority of an arrest warrant, but without a search warrant, arrested
the defendant for selling forged U.S. postage stamps, and then made a
lengthy search of the desk, safe, and file cabinets in his small, public
office. At trial, the government sought to introduce into evidence 573
forged stamps discovered during the search. Even though the officers
had had time to obtain a search warrant, the Court held that the
warrantless search was valid and that the evidence was therefore admis-
sible. The majority opinion emphasized that the central concern in
any fourth amendment inquiry is the reasonableness of the search in
the "total atmosphere"9 of the case and that failure to secure a warrant
would not invalidate an otherwise permissible search.10
The Rabinowitz majority based its decision on precedent: when in-
cident to valid arrests, warrantless searches of the person and of the
area under his "immediate control" had not been held to violate fourth
amendment rights in previous decisions." Such searches have been
justified in other opinions as necessary to protect the arresting officer
against armed attack and to prevent the destruction of evidence of
crime.12 As a practical matter, however, the scope of arrest-based
searches has not been limited in strict accord with these objectives.8
9. Id. at 66.
10. Id.
11. The Court thus overruled Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), decided
two years earlier, which had held that the acquisition of a warrant where practical was
a necessary condition for reasonableness. In overruling Trupiano, the Court returned to
its earlier holdings in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), and Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (19,47). In Harris, the Court had reaffirmed Marron and upheld it
warrantless search of an entire apartment. This search was found to be constitutional
because "incident to" a valid arrest under an arrest warrant for a crime involving a
forged check. The intensive search turned up forged selective service cards.
12. E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 72-75 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). According to Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964), "[t]he rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for
example, by the need to sesze weapons and other things which might be used to assault
an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destrnction of evi-
dence of the crime-things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence
is on the accused's person or under his immediate control." (Emphasis added.) Despite
the mysterious "for example," a thorough search of the case law reveals no other justi.
fications for warrantless searches incident to arrest which do not collapse upon careful
inspection into one of the two bases articulated in Preston. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 310-11 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
13. The protective barrier established by the Rabinowitz Court-that the search Inci.
dent to arrest must extend no further than the area of the arrestee's immediate control
-has not been maintained in lower court decisions. Justice Frankfurter, ill his dissent,
had foreseen that this limitation would be an ineffective one. 339 U.S. at 79. The weak.
ness in the concept of "immediate control" is that it permits a search of the premises
wherever the arrest happens to occur, thus making crucial a circumstance not closely re
lated to the reasons for allowing a search without warrant. See the ovinion of Judge
Hand below, in which the appellate court had refused to admit the eidence from the
warrantless Rabinowitz search. 176 F.2d 732, 735 (1949).
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Generally, the lower courts have approved searches of persons or
places regardless of their scope if "incident to a lawful arrest."' 4
Given the permissiveness of the Rabinowitz rule, one is not surprised
to find the police indulging in warrantless searches with great fre-
quency. To avoid both the inconvenience and the restraints of the
warrant procedure, police regularly arrange their arrests to squeeze
out of them the maximum "warrantless search value." For example,
officers may wait to arrest a suspect until he arrives home after work
so that they may then engage in a general, warrantless search of his
home.15 Or if police do not have probable cause to arrest or search a
man suspected of a serious crime, they may arrest him instead on a
minor charge such as vagrancy or speeding, and then carry out an
otherwise impermissible search "incident to" the arrest on the lesser
charge.16  So effective are these tactics that a police department in a
large city may conduct thousands of searches in the course of a year
without procuring more than a handful of search warrants. 17 This
14. The disastrous consequences of this approach are perhaps most easily shown by
a selection of recent appellate court decisions. See, e.g., Wellman v. United States, 4 Crum.
L. REP,. 2259 (5th Cir. Dec. 5, 1968) (on the basis of a valid arrest for speeding, the full
search of an automobile without antecedent justification was allowed because it was
"incident to arrest," although no further evidence of the crime could have been found):
People v. Braden, 34 I1l. 2d 516, 216 N.E.2d 808 (1966) (validating search in or around
the premises of arrest, incident to the arrest; the search was of an apartment plus a
refrigerator and a closet outside of the apartment): State v. Miller, 47 N.J. 273, 220 A.2d
409 (1966) (expands the "area under control" of an arrestee to include another person's
residne which an arrestee is visiting. This onept would seemn to permit unlimited
warrantless intrusions by imaginative police officers. The famous protest of Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (d Cir. 1926), would now have
to read, "After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will among his papers in
search of whatever will convict him, appears to us to be indistinguishable from what
might be done under a general warrant; indeed, the warrant would give more protection,
for presumably it must be issued by a magistrate. True, by hypothesis the power would
not exist, if the supposed offender were not found on the premises; but it is small
consolation to know that one's papers are safe only so long as one is not at home [and
has no visitors]"); People v. Olszowy, 47 Misc. 2d 859, 263 N.Y.S.2d ,01 (Erie Co. 1965)(the home of a rape suspect having been searched in his absence, the Court held the
evidence discovered there admissible at trial because seized incident to a "lawfully at-
tempted arrest"); Loften v. Warden, 2 CaR. L. REP. 2056 (Nev. Sup. Ct. Sept. 25, 1967)
(on the basis of an arrest for disorderly conduct-a misdemeanor for which no fruits or
instruments can exist-the search of the person of a "very quiet" drunk revealed evidence
of marijuana; the Court permitted the admission of this evidence at trial because it was
discovered in a search incident to a valid arrest).
15. Petitioner accuses the police of employing this tactic in People v. Chimel, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 714 (Ct. App. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Chimel v. State, 68 Cal. 2d 448, 67 Cal. Rptr.
421, cert. granted, 89 S. Ct. 404 (1968).
16. "Arrest under a warrant for a minor or trumped-up charge has been a familiar
practice in the past, is a commonplace in the police state of today, and too well-known
in this country." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
17. For example, during the years 1956-57, 29 search warrants were issued in Detroit;
approximately 30 in Milwaukee; and 17 in Wichita. The number of search warrants has
remained fairly constant during the years since 1956-57. L. TiwFFAv, D. MclmnrnR & D.
RorTErmER, DETEcroN OF CnrM 99-100 (1967). See also Note, 100 U. PAI. ItEv. 1182,
1192 (1952) (having surveyed Philadelphia police practice, the author concludes, "the
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conduct conflicts sharply with the constitutional standards which the
Supreme Court has been developing in recent fourth amendment
cases.
I. Evolving Fourth Amendment Theory
Two principles stressed in the Court's recent decisions would seem
to require a reexamination of the rules governing arrest-based searches.
The first of these principles represents a shift away from Rabinowitz
to the position that securing a warrant where practical is a necessary
precondition for a reasonable search.' 8 Although extensive use of the
warrant procedure entails significant costs for society,' 9 the Supreme
Court has now decided that antecedent justification is so central to the
fourth amendment that, subject to a few carefully delineated excep-
tions, "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment." 20 Assessment of the reasonableness of a proposed
use of search warrants in the [Philadelphia] cases examined was virtually non.existent');
Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People v.
Cahan, 43 CAUiF. L. R v. 565, 570 (1955).
18. The legal world has long debated whether the warrant clause of the fourth amend-
ment states an independent requirement that a warrant must be obtained before a search
whenever possible or whether the prior attainment of a warrant is only one factor
relevant to a judgment of the reasonableness of a search. For a thorough discussion of
this controversy, see Note, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J.
521, 524 n.13, 529 n.35 (1968).
In addition to the cases cited in the text, emphasis on the importance of the warrant
procedure may be found in the following cases: Terry v. Ohio, 892 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) ("We
do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure,
or that in most instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be
excused by exigent circumstances," citing among other cases United States v. Ventrcsca,
380 U.S. 102 (1965)); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964); Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1968) (despite
Rabinowitz, police must obtain a warrant when they have ample time). For non.majorlty
arguments eloquently supporting the warrant requirement, see Ford v. United States, 352
F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Wright, J., dissenting) and Huguez v. United States, No. 21,513
(9th Cir., Sept. 30, 1968) (Ely, J., concurring).
19. The Supreme Court no doubt realizes that the warrant principle recognized In
the inspection cases involves a substantial cost to government. If warrants are used more
extensively, more work will be required of magistrates and police officers, and more
magistrates and police officers will be required. Other limitations, respected by police In
conducting searches and enforced by the courts through exclusionary rules, will also
prevent the government from obtaining and using certain evidcnce that might otherwise
have served to convict wrong-doers. See pp. 437-41 infra. So far these costs have been
relatively minor, but the rules to be proposed in this Note for the control of searches
incident to arrest might make the costs rise greatly. Nonetheless the clear trend of the
Supreme Court's recent decisions has been to regard these costs as less important than
the preservation of individual privacy, dignity, and security from unnecessary Intrusions
by government agents. These private interests being of the first order, the costs of using
expanded warrant and limitation procedures must be borne by society.
20. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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search by a neutral magistrate is thought by the Court to be a necessary
restraint on police.21 In theory, the magistrate should refuse to approve
unreasonable intrusions and should limit by warrant the scope and
manner of justifiable searches. In practice, review by a neutral magis-
trate may become routinized and thus fail to prevent unjustified
searches. But at the least, the warrant procedure facilitates later
judicial review of the search's constitutionality by requiring a prior
sworn statement of police justifications.
The warrant principle has been vigorously applied in recent fourth
amendment cases. In Katz v. United States,22 the Court held eaves-
dropping evidence inadmissible because not obtained under warrant,
even though the eavesdropping was conducted with probable cause and
in a reasonable manner. And in Camara v. Muncipal Court,23 the
majority concluded that government inspections of private property
were unreasonable, absent consent, unless authorized by a valid war-
rant. Even before Camara, the Court in Schmerber v. California,24
had implicitly applied this principle to one kind of search incident to
arrest-a blood test taken at a hospital to verify charges of drunken
driving. Only after finding that the evidence (alcohol in the blood)
would probably have disappeared before a warrant could have been
secured and that the "search" had been made under ideal conditions,
did the Court reject petitioner's claim that the blood test was an
unreasonable search because not authorized by warrant.
The second principle requiring revision of the present rule on
searches incident to arrest is a long established one, recently given new
emphasis: a completed search will comply with the fourth amendment's
protective requirements only if its scope is no broader than legitimate
governmental objectives justify. This increased emphasis on limiting
the scope of searches is responsive to the manifest need for more sen-
sitive guidelines for assessing the reasonableness of searches. Although
the Supreme Court contends that it "has held in the past that a search
which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment
by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope,"25 lower courts have not
in general followed the few cases" in which the Supreme Court has
21. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1962); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); McDonald v. United States, 335 US. 451, 455-56(1948).
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
24. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
25. Terry v. United States, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1968).
26. Such cases are Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957); Go-Bart Importing
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actually applied this principle. Under the pressure of heavy case loads,
the lower courts have generally succumbed to the temptation to
create broad categories of searches which are presumed to be reasonable
-a maneuver that enables the courts to avoid the difficult task of
evaluating the scope and manner of each individual search.-"
The Court's increasing attention to limitations in scope is closely
related to its recent acceptance of the concept of "variable probable
cause.' '2 8 In deciding the housing inspection and stop-and-frisk cases,
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-58 (1931). See also United States v. Di Re, 352
U.S. 581, 586-87 (1948). Since Rabinowitz, however, no Supreme Court case has struck
down a search incident to a lawful arrest. Language from the concurrence of Justice
Harlan in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 77 (1968), would seem to indicate that even
the Supreme Court has faltered in its attention to the intensity and scope of searches
incident to arrest: "... an officer on probable cause is entitled to make a very full
incident search .... " citing Rabinowitz as the leading case.
27. See note 14 supra. See also United States v. Worthy, No. 20,888 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6,
1968) at 10 (Wright, J., dissenting).
The idea that a warrantless search incident to arrest always satisfies the Fourth
Amendment has become a virtual shibboleth, unthinkingly repeated by courts. But
it is a shibboleth without adequate foundation in reason, and it is time that it be
reexamined.
Id. at 13-14. In Adair v. State, 3 Ciuss. L. REP. 2037-38 (rex. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 27,
1968), Judge Onion dissenting accused his brothers of holding that a search incident to
a traffic arrest is reasonable per se.
Examples of other categories of warrantless searches presumed to be reasonablc arc
those of "hot pursuit," "exigent circumstances," and "consent." Consent searches are
also in serious need of stricter limitations than those by which they are currently con-
trolled, but the considerations involved in developing the limitations arc complex, and
the problem is not taken up in this Note. Cf. note 59 infra.
28. "Probable cause to arrest means evidence that would warrant a prudent and
reasonable man ... in believing that a particular person has committed or is committing
a crime," Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 75 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). Accord,
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304 (1966); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Henry
v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 & n.5
(1958); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1948); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). While probable cause for arrest denotes the evidentiary state
required to justify arrest, probable cause for a search in the case of a crime necessitates
an additional element. The evidence must indicate (1) that a crime has been committed;
(2) that a given person committed it; and (3) that the described object of search is likely
to be found in a given place.
Though a balancing test shows administrative searches to be reasonable and thus
constitutional under the first clause of the fourth amendment, the second clause states
unambiguously that "no warrant shall issue but on probable cause." The method of
accommodation adopted by the Court in Camara was to invert the traditional formula
for probable cause, and thus to redefine the essential term:
The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private
property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness Is
still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest Justifies the intrusion con-
templated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant.
387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967). Thus the administrative search cases may be understood to
articulate a new concept of "variable probable cause." The concept of "variable probable
cause" was not altogether foreign even to the law which preceded Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See, e.g., FED. R. CIm. P. 41(c), which requires a higher
quantum of cause to warrant a night search than a day search. Under the theory
of variable probable cause, the test for any particular intrusion is "would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of seizure or search warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 21-22 (1968).
Though the emphasis of this Note is on search, the same kind of analysis applies to
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the Court has recognized that the fourth amendment governs all in-
trusions by agents of the public upon personal security" and that some
intrusions will be reasonable on less evidence than that required for
full criminal searches. In the case of housing inspections, the Court
found that a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy
could be reasonably initiated on the lower evidentiary standard of
"area probable cause."210 Essential to the Court's acceptance of "vari-
able probable cause" is the notion that when searches are permitted
on less evidence than is required for the usual criminal search, the in-
trusiveness of such searches must also be more limited if they are to
be constitutional.2 '
seizure, and the terminology of seizure of the person (e.g., of "stop." .,arrest," and "im-
prisonment') may be used to illustrate some of the interesting possibilities which follow
from treating various fourth amendment intrusions in terms of a model of "variable
probable cause." The traditional expression "probable cause," like "reasonable suspicion"
and "beyond a reasonable doubt," has been used as a label for the quantum of evidence
necessary to justify a particular level of intrusion on personal privacy in the criminal
law area; but it would be perfectly rational, although unusual, to speak of "probable
cause to stop" and "probable cause to imprison" as well as "probable cause to arrest."
In each case the reasonableness and thus the constitutionality of the search would depend
on the interrelation between the amount of evidence, the justifications for the search, and
the scope and manner of the search.
Rules limiting the scope of each major category of arrest (seizure of the person) to its
specific justification and required evidentiary standard must be worked out in the same
manner as they are now being established by the courts for various categories and sub-
categories of searches. For an article which presents the problem very dearly, see Reich,
Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161 (1966). See also United States
v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 77-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
29. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n.15 (1968).
30. The Court noted that housing inspections were "neither personal in nature nor
aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime .... " 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
31. This notion so far has been used most effectively to set proper limits on the inten-
sity of searches made by customs officials at borders. Because the governmental justifications
for border searches remain constant, the permissible intensity of the search has been al-
lowed to increase in direct proportion to the degree of cause justifying intrusion. Thus,
the mere fact of a border crossing has been held to justify a search of baggage. vehicle,
and wallet.
If, however, the search of the person is to go further, if the party, male or female, is
to be required to strip, we think that something more, at least a real suspicion, di-
rected specifically to that person, should be required. And if there is to be more than
a casual examination of the body, if in the course of the search of a woman there is
to be a requirement that she manually open her vagina for visual inspection to see if
she has something concealed there, we think that we should require more than a mere
suspicion. Surely, to require such a performance is a serious invasion of personal
privacy and dignity, and so unlawful if "unwarranted." Surely, in such a case, to be
warranted, the official's action should be backed by at least the "dear indication,"
the "plain suggestion," required in Schmerber and in Rivas.
Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967).
Though there is still much argument as to where particular lines should be drawn, the
proportionality notion is well applied in Henderson. Three discrete quantum levels of
evidence--(1) "the mere fact of crossing the border"; (2) "a real suspicion specifically
directed"; and (3) "a clear indication"t-are each understood as capable of initiating a rea-
sonable constitutional search, provided the degree of intrusion in each individual case is
correlated to the quantum level of cause justifying its initiation.
A vital factor to bear in mind is that as these steps progress the burden of the law
enforcement agency increases. What may constitute probable cause for arrest does not
necessarily constitute probable cause for a charge on arraignment.
439
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 78: 433, 1969
In judging the reasonableness of a search, it is natural to weigh the
government's interest, the evidence justifying the search, and the scope
of the search together. The Court in Terry v. Ohio32, however, has
divided the determination of reasonableness into a dual inquiry:
"whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether
it was reasonably limited in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place. '33 Whatever the Supreme Court's
intent in devising this two-step test, its approach is likely to encourage
the lower courts to pay closer attention to the interrelated factors of
justification and scope in determining the reasonableness of individual
searches. 34
The stop-and-frisk cases offer useful illustrations of the new test at
work. In Terry the Court first decided that some intrusion was reason-
able because (1) the government had a general interest in protecting its
investigating agents and (2) the specific facts of the case created a rea-
sonable suspicion that the men searched were armed and dangerous.35
As a second step the Court inquired whether the scope of the actual
search was properly limited to its justifications. The search-a pat-
down or "frisk" of the suspect's outer clothing, with a further intrusion
only after an object possibly a weapon has been felt-was found to be
reasonable because no broader than necessary to meet its legitimate
objectives.30 By contrast, the search of a narcotic suspect's pocket in
Sibron v. New York37 failed both halves of the dual test. Reaching into
Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
What is thus envisioned is a step profile, to wit, that the probability of guilt required
to subject a person to official action is directly correlated to the degree of interference
with individual freedom contemplated by the action.
United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also LaFave, Detention
for Investigation by Police: An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962 WAS11. U.L.Q. 331,
358-60.
Another factor in the balancing of evidentiary standards against intrusiveness should
perhaps be the nature of the crime. For example, many who condemn wiretapping gener.
ally would make an exception for kidnapping or matters of national security. Justice
Jackson first advanced the argument that the seriousness of the crime should influence the
determination of the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest in his dissent in Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-88 (1949).
32. 392 US. 1 (1968).
33. Id. at 20.
34. Both the need for closer attention to justifications and scope and the difficulties of
teaching lower courts how properly to evaluate these factors in assessing the reasonableness
of searches are exemplified by a recent Illinois Supreme Court decision which
purports to follow Terry into the "promised land." In People v. Tassone, 4 Citu,. L. Rev.
2005 (Ill. Sup. Ct. Sept. 24, 1968), the Court permitted the stopping and "frisking" of a
driver suspected of possessing not a weapon but a stolen truck. Even though it was based
only on suspicion, the "frisk" of the driver for evidence of authority to operate a truck on
Illinois highways was found to be reasonable because it was "extremely limited in scope."
35. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-23, 27-28 (1968).
36. Id. at 30-31.
37. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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Sibron's pocket was unreasonable at its inception because the specific
facts of the case did not give the investigating officer justification for
any search whatsoever. And even if the officer had had reason to sus-
pect that Sibron was armed, the actual search-a direct intrusion into
the pocket rather than a frisk-would still have been invalid under
the second part of the test because not "reasonably limited in scope to
the accomplishment of the only goal which might conceivably have
justified its inception-the protection of the officer ..... ,
III. Application of the Evolving Theory to Searches Incident to
Arrest
As the housing inspection and stop-and-frisk cases make dear,
"reasonable" searches may be initiated on a variety of evidentiary stan-
dards. Acceptance of the concept of "variable probable cause" does not,
however, require courts to determine without guidelines the reason-
ableness of particular searches. The courts have used only a small
number of categories of searches, and it is practical to formulate rules
to guide beleaguered magistrates, police, and lower court judges in
authorizing, conducting, and evaluating searches within each of the
delineated categories. Following the Supreme Court's lead in Camara
and Terry, appellate courts will no doubt direct their attention to
defining more precisely the categories of searches and to setting limits
on the range, intensity, duration, purpose, and perhaps punitive conse-
quences of each. The category labelled "searches incident to arrest"
is in particular need of such attention; the Rabinowitz rule has failed
to protect individual privacy adequately and should be redrawn.
Application of the warrant and limitation principles to arrest-based
searches would better implement the fourth amendment's guarantees.
First, exceptions from the warrant requirement should be more care-
fully delimited. Intrusions should be made pursuant to a warrant,
unless the achievement of the legitimate objectives of a search or part
of a search incident to arrest would be prevented by compliance with
the warrant requirement. Second, especially for those searches or parts
of searches which cannot practically be controlled by warrant, guide-
lines must be established to insure that "no greater invasion of privacy"
occurs than is "necessary under all the circumstances" of each kind of
search.39 The governmental interests justifying arrest-based searches-
38. Id. at 62.
39. Berger v. New York, 588 U.S. 41, 57 (1967).
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which the Supreme Court has identified as the discovery of concealed
weapons and the preservation of destructible evidence4 0-can be the
bases for these guidelines.41
A. The Frisk for Weapons
The government's interest in the safety of police officers certainly
justifies some search of an arrestee to discover concealed weapons. But
since this objective can be attained by a protective frisk,42 no greater
intrusion should be permitted. If during the frisk the arresting officer
feels an object which might be a weapon, he should be allowed to take
the object from the arrestee. But objects other than weapons should
not be subject to seizure, nor even to careful examination, unless they
are obviously contraband.43
Whether weapons or other objects seized in a protective frisk should
be allowed into evidence at trial is a difficult question. The present rule
is that evidence of other crimes discovered during the course of a valid
search is admissible.44 But the traditional rule, when applied to the
40. See p. 431 & note 12 supra.
41. Those who wish to see the discussion of rules for searches incident to arrest In the
larger context of which it forms a part are referred to Packer, Two Models of the Criminal
Process, 113 U. PA. L. R.v. 1 (1964). Packer's two models are posited on polar valuejudgments and assumptions. His thesis is that a strong tendency may be observed, at
least in judicial decisions, to move from the "Crime Control" model (administrative;
"assembly line') to the "Due Process" model (adversarl; "obstacle course"). This Note,
part descriptive and part normative, shows recent searc and seizure law as conforming
to the more general trend observed by Packer and makes recommendations for change
in the law of searches incident to arrest, so as to bring it back into line. Specifically,
the prescriptive section of this Note tries to make the control of arrest-based searches
part of the tendency observed by Packer to "move from rules that require case.by.case
determination of prejudice to the accused to rules setting forth general standards of
police and prosecutorial conduct." Id. 36.
42. See p. 440 supra.
43. Thus, if the frisk of a man arrested for vagrancy reveals an object possibly a
pistol, which turns out after further intrusion into the pocket to be a plastic bottle, the
bottle should be returned to the arrestee without closer examination. An alternative
rule-less restrictive to police-would allow the arresting officer to keep the bottle If
he has probable cause from first sight or feel, together with the totality of circumstances
under which the search has taken place, to believe that the possession of the bottle
constitutes a crime (e.g., illegal possession of narcotics). Where he has probable cause to
search for a weapon at the time of arrest, the arresting officer may of course search di-
rectly for the weapon on the person of the arrestee under the rules for evidentiary
searches described in the text, infra. But where the evidence available at the moment of
arrest does not amount to probable cause that the arrestee possesses a weapon-i.e., when
the frisk for weapons is purely protective in nature and is initiated on either reasonable
suspicion or a still lower evidentiary standard-the danger of police abuse of such a
search may require tighter exclusionary protections.
44. The right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures has long been
enforced by exclusion of evidence obtained from such searches. Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914) (exclusion in federal courts of evidence discovered during unconstitutional
searches by federal officers); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (similar exclusion in state
prosecutions).
In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Supreme Court abolished the prohibition
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protective frisk, has the disadvantage of presenting over-zealous police
officers with a tempting loophole in the fourth amendment's safe-
guards: when a frisk for weapons is used by the police as a pretext for
an evidentiary search, the present rule will not protect the individual
by excluding the fruits of such a search unless the trial court is able to
discover the illegal purpose.
If efforts to teach the police their constitutional responsibilities fail
and the privilege to search for weapons incident to arrest is seriously
abused, it would be well to consider a per se rule excluding all evi-
dence, including weapons, discovered during arrest-based frisks.
45
Though the proposed rule would involve significant costs in police
efficiency,46 it would discourage frisks used as pretexts for evidentiary
searches by making them unprofitable and would save courts the diffi-
culties of case-by-case evaluation of police good faith. The proposed
rule is also in harmony with the Court's recognition in Camara that
searches on lower evidentiary standards require stricter limitations.
Eliminating the retributive consequences of protective frisks, which
are initiated on a lesser evidentiary justification than searches for evi-
dence, would substantially limit the hostility of these intrusions with-
out in any way hindering the discovery of concealed weapons.4 7
against seizures of "mere evidence." The traditional exclusionary rule has thus been modi-
fied to permit the admission at trial of fruits, instruments, and other evidence uncovered
during constitutional searches.
45. Under the proposal of this Note, the exclusionary rule would no longer be used as
a means of discriminating between "good" and "bad" frisks.
It is only honest to note that the omens for the adoption of the proposed new exclu-
sionary rule are at present unfavorable. The Supreme Court takes a position contrary to
the one outlined above when it states in Terry that "the exclusionary rule has its limita-
tions, however, as a tool of judicial control. It cannot be properly invoked to exclude the
products of legitimate police investigative techniques on the ground that much conduct
which is closely similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional protections."
392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968). But see, e.g., Note, Selective Detention and the Exclusionary Rule,
34 U. Cm. L. Rav. 158, 166 (1966).
The exclsionary rule, however employed, cannot, of course, prevent frisks which are
motivated by a desire to harass rather than by a desire to find other-crimes evidence. For
a discussion of alternatives (or supplements) to the exclusionary rule which would also
reach harassment, see Foote, Tort Responsibility for Police Violations of Individual Rights,
39 MINN. L. Rxv. 493 (1955); Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitu-
tional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968).
An alternative approach to restricting frisks for weapons on less than reasonable suspi-
cion, whether made incident to a valid arrest or not, would be to label all such searches
"unreasonable." If police then chose to continue to make such searches, they would do
so only to protect themselves, knowing full-well that discovered weapons and other eii-
dence of crime would not be admissible at trial. The difficulty with this approach is that
it is confusing to call such searches "unreasonable" if they are actually justifiable when
properly limited to the protection of the officer. Moreover, for a system of criminal ad-
ministration openly to permit so-called "unreasonable" searches would be to undermine
the respect essential for good police-community relations, particularly in the disad-
-vantaged neighborhoods, where the bulk of such searches would be conducted.
46. See note 19 supra.
47. Whether or not this proposal for a stricter exclusionary rule is accepted, it is clear
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B. The Search for Evidence
Traditionally, searches of both person and place have been permitted
when incident to arrest. Ordinarily, if police have probable cause for
an arrest, they will also have probable cause to search for evidence of
the alleged crime. But all such searches should be limited, and, for
many of them, a warrant should be required. Because the need for an
immediate search of the person incident to arrest differs from the need
for an immediate search of the place of arrest, separate rules must be
formulated for these two classes of evidentiary searches.
Search of the Person. Since fruits, instruments, or other evidence of
crime concealed on the person of the arrestee may be easily disposed of
or destroyed, the arresting officer will often be justified in searching
without delay. But a warrantless search should be allowed only when
it is impossible for police to secure a search warrant in advance,48
because an arrest is carried out immediately upon receipt of incrimi-
nating information.
The limitation principle also requires that when police search a
person incident to arrest, they search only for evidence which they have
probable cause to believe will be found on the person, and that the
search be no more intrusive than necessary to find that object.49 For
some crimes-such as status or traffic crimes-no search of the person
should be permitted at all, because no evidence of such crimes can
exist. 50
that frisks for weapons on less than reasonable suspicion (which is the evidentiary standard
required by the Court in Terry for initiation of a non-arrest-based frisk) should have their
scope limited to the fullest degree still consistent with protection of the officer; the claws
of such intrusions, in the form of retributive consequences, must be clipped.
48. Technological advance may soon permit extension of the warrant principle to
searches or parts of searches for which a warrant requirement is not currently feasible.
Is it so unlikely that computerized warrants may some day be required as controls not
only for arrest-based searches of the person but also for stop-and-frisk?
49. For example, an arresting officer searching incident to arrest for an object such as
a gun or a stolen flute should frisk first, to avoid intruding unnecessarily into "innocent"
pockets.
50. In United States v. Worthy, No. 20,888 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1968), Judge Wright
propounds this argument in his dissent. The majority opinion affirms the conviction on
narcotics charges of a man originally arrested for vagrancy. The conviction was based on
evidence obtained during a full search of his person incident to the vagrancy arrest.
A technical difficulty exists with Wright's argument if "no money' is taken to be an
instrument of vagrancy; if "no money" must be had by a person in order for him to com-
mit the crime of vagrancy, it should be proper to search for "no money" as evidence of the
crime. The search for "no money" would of necessity be wider in scope than the frisk for
weapons, and would justify, according to the traditional rule, the discovery and seizure
of other-crimes evidence. But the justifications for an immediate warrantless search are
not very strong in this situation. It is highly unlikely, after all, that evidence of "no
money" could be destroyed (presumably a chum of the arrestee would have to slip him
a tenspot on the sly). The most obvious solution is to permit police and judges to
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The rules described above, which strictly limit searches of the person
incident to arrest, would be for nought if an unrestricted search of the
person were to be allowed a short step later in the criminal process. To
prevent circumvention of the proposed safeguards, searches to meet
other governmental interests arising after arrest should be conducted
under controls similar to those proposed for searches incident to arrest.
The objective of keeping weapons and other improper articles out of
jails would justify a thorough search of a person about to be im-
prisoned. But since the legitimate objective of such a search is not to
obtain evidence, a warrantless search should be allowed only after the
arrestee has been permitted to store in a privileged place (such as a
"safety deposit" box)51 those personal items which he does not wish
to take with him into prison. The need for positive identification of
the arrestee may also justify some searches of the person;5 2 but clearly,
no rummaging about in pockets for identifying articles is reasonable
if the arrestee can be identified by less intrusive means such as a phone
call to his employer or a check at his alleged home address.r0 If police
must intrude more deeply into the privacy of the arrestee to secure
evidence for identification, their search should be pursuant to a war-
rant.
54
presume that the accused vagrant has no money unless he produces money when re-
quested to and thus rebuts the presumption.
An alternative to the approach taken in the text would be to reduce or abolish status
crimes. For materials detailing the abuses inherent in a criminal system permitting arrests
for status crimes, see W. LAFAVE, Aursr 354-63 (1965); Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on
Suspicion, 70 YAE L.J. 1, 9 (1960); Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration,
104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 695-31, 649 (1956). See also note 56 infra, which discusses searches
of both person and place incident to arrest for traffic violations.
51. If defendant chooses to put his possessions into a "safety deposit" box, can this act
be additional evidence to obtain a search warrant? This is a problem in which the fourth
and fifth amendments "run almost into each other." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1885). Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94 (1967), supports the proposition
that no inference should be permitted from the fact that a man chooses to keep his pos-
sessions from being inspected. The court in Simmons held that the testimony of a defen-
dant on a motion to suppress evidence on fourth amendment grounds may not be there-
after admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt, unless he makes no objection.
52. The justification of such searches rests on the assumption of a significant correlation
between probable cause to arrest for one crime and guilt for other crimes, still unsolved
on police books. How high this correlation must be for the intrusion it supports to be
reasonable-and with what variation for what crimes-is yet to be decided.
53. For a case which illuminates this discussion, see the separate opinions in the dis-
missal of certiorari in Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 US. 653 (1968).
54. Under the reasoning of Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966). tie
fifth amendment does not prohibit fingerprinting. Nor does the fourth amendment, ac-
cording to most courts. See Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1965); Smith
v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963). According to United States v. Laub
Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ohio 1968), fingerprinting is permissible under the
fourth amendment even for arrests on misdemeanors. However fingerprinting and the
strip search for scars are treated, the search of the pockets for identifying articles would
seem to be sufficiently intrusive to be unreasonable unless conducted under warrant,
barring exigent circumstances.
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Searches of the Place. A different set of limitations is required for
searches of the place of arrest. The need for immediate action, which
in the past has been taken to justify warrantless searches of the area of
arrest, can be eliminated if the police remove the arrestee from the
place where weapons or evidence might be concealed." If police need
to search further in the area of arrest, they should be required to act
under a warrant.56 Whenever practical, this warrant should be secured
in advance; but in those cases in which no time was available to obtain
a search warrant before the arrest, the police should be allowed to
"seize" the place of arrest until a further search can be judically
authorized.5 7
A "seizure" of the place, involving the sealing of a home or car, or at
least police surveillance of other lawful occupants would prevent the
concealment or destruction of evidence while the warrant is being
sought.58 Those persons not arrested but either asked to leave or placed
55. An alternative response to this need-more appropriate in some situations than In
others-would be for the police to handcuff the arrestee immediately after his arrest.
56. In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), a unanimous Supreme Court limited
the then-existing rule as to automobile searches. Preston involved a warrantless search of
an auto, remote in time and place from the arrest of the driver and passengers. Before
Preston, such searches were often allowed by courts and justified by loose references to
the "exceptional" nature (i.e., the mobility) of cars. While recognizing that questions in-
volving searches of cars or other things readily moved cannot be treated as identical to
questions arising out of searches of immovable structures like houses, the opinion stressed
that, even in the case of motorcars, the test remains, "was the search reasonable?" Under
Preston, then, if the search is to be held constitutional, it must be contemporaneous with,
and in the same place as, the arrest.
Sheridan v. State, 43 Ala. App. 239, 187 So. 2d 294, cert. denied, 279 Ala. 674, 189 So. 2d
470 (1966); cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1019 (1967), goes one step further in the direction of this
Note's prescription, by imposing the warrant-where-practical rule on search of a car Inci-
dent to arrest. Sheridan was found sleeping in his car at night with a pistol on the front
seat. He was awakened by the flashlight of a state trooper and arrested for illegal posses.
sion of a weapon. A search of his person incident to this arrest, revealed a small vial con.
taining some pills; the deputy then searched the car's glove compartment and found
additional pills. Some time later, in front of the station house, and still without the bene-
fit of a warrant, deputies searched the trunk and found more pills.
On appeal from conviction for possessing narcotic drugs and for carrying an unlicensed
pistol in a vehicle, the Court of Appeals held that the evidence sustained conviction for
the latter offense but not for the former. Nowhere in the toxicologist's testimony was It
possible to isolate the source from which the deputy had obtained the contraband narcotic
drugs.
As to the search of the trunk, the court was squarely within the authority of Preston in
finding the search not contemporaneous and therefore unconstitutional. But in ruling that
the contemporaneous search of the glove compartment was also unconstitutional, the court
made an important advance. The court reasoned that an automatic exemption of all such
searches from the warrant requirement creates a category of exceptions which Is overly
broad. "The rule as to the need inherent in the nature of vehicles (because they can be
taken off while the officer goes for a warrant) under Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925), does not bear on the instant facts. Neither Sheridan nor any possible confederate
was shown to have any likelihood of spiriting his car away." This opinion, though It floats
at present as a lonely marker in a foggy sea, is the logical extension of Preston.
57. "Seizure" of a movable such as a car or boat would be comparable to the impound.
ing process which often accompanies the arrest on a serious charge of a person in an
automobile.
58. As with searches of the person for evidence, searches of the place of arrest should
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under watch would, of course, suffer a temporary impairment of their
privacy and freedom. But the alternative means of meeting the govern-
ment's legitimate need-an immediate warrantless search-would
normally involve a still greater intrusion on the important fourth
amendment rights of the persons involved, and should not be allowed
unless these persons knowingly consent to such a search.o
IV. Beyond Rules
Implementation of the rules proposed above could not prevent by
itself all violations of fourth amendment rights during searches inci-
dent to arrest. For those dimensions of searches-such as intensity and
duration-which are not easily governed by rules, police and lower
courts must endeavor to apply case by case the general command that
searches be reasonable.60 Over time, review by appellate courts of these
base-level applications of the reasonableness requirement should build
up standards to guide the police and lower courts in their decisions.
Meanwhile, however, adoption of the rules and procedures proposed
in this Note would substantially reduce the unconstitutional intrusions
on individual privacy which now occur each day "incident to" arrest.
be permitted only where the nature of the crime gives promise of evidence. In D)ke v.
Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, (1968), the Supreme Court hinted that search
of a car inddent to arrest for a traffic offense, without additional cause, might alays be
unconstitutional. It did not, however, reach this question, because it held the search
in question unconstitutional on Preston grounds, as being too remote in tine and place
to be properly incident to arrest. "I would go further. I would hold that, pretext or no
pretext, a lawful arrest of an automobile driver for a traffic offense provides no lawful
predicate for the search of the driver or his car-absent special circumstances." Amador-
Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968) (Wisdom, J.) (dictum); see Note,
Search Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violation, 1959 Ws. . REv. 347.
59. Excessive seizures of places of arrest might well place new strain on the concept of
waiver of fourth amendment rights. To many people, governmental seizures of their homes
or cars would be more offensive than immediate warrantless searches. In such cases, if all
the people who are present and have fourth amendment rights in the place of arrest desire
to waive their rights to a warranted search, this desire should normally be respected. How-
ever, safeguards would be necessary to prevent over-zealous police officers from ob-
taining waivers from people ignorant of their rights and from coercing people
into waiving the rights of which they are aware. The best solution would probably be
to use a Miranda-type approach, requiring that a warning of the right to a warranted
search (vith its additional safeguards) first be given to the search "victims" so that any
waiver given will be given with full knowledge of the constitutional rights waived. An
additional requirement should be that the police not unnecessarily use the power to seize
the place of arrest as a means of coercing a citizen into agreeing to an immediate warrant-
less search. The problem of consent searches generally is a difficult one, and beyond the
scope of this Note. While it is possible for individuals to consent to searches incident to
arrest, police do not usually seek consent because they do not require it. The rules sug-
gested for control of search incident to arrest are based on the assumption that no valid
consent is given by the individuals being searched.
60. For a hint that police officers are becoming more sympathetic to the concerns
of their fellow citizens, see Ker v. California, 374 US. 23, 28 (1962): "... three officers
and a fourth, Officer Love ...." (Emphasis added.)
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